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THE SCOPE OF INDEPENDENT APPELLATE COURT
REVIEW IN PUBLIC PERSON LIBEL CASES
Paul D. Driscoll *
I. IMNRODUCrION
Juries are particularly unsympathetic to media defendants in deciding
libel cases.1 While the trend is toward fewer media defendants going to
trial, once there, they are losing a higher percentage of cases and facing
larger compensatory and punitive damage awards.2
Media defendants also face a declining success rate in the appellate
courts. A Libel Defense Resource Center report on 1989-90 cases found
that 48% of the libel verdicts against the media were upheld in their
entirety, a sharp increase from an average of about 25% in prior studies and
38% in 1987-88.3 Although this trend is distressing to media interests,
appellate court review remains pivotal in reversing media defeats in the trial
courts and in limiting excessive damage awards. For the entire decade of
the 1980s, 75% of the awards against media defendants were reversed,
remanded, or substantially reduced on appeal.4
* Paul D. Driscoll (Ph.D., Indiana University, 1985) is Director of Broadcasting and Broadcast
Journalism at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida.
1. The Libel Defense Resource Center ('LDRC") reported that media defendants won 26%
of the 213 jury verdicts decided in the 1980s. The median jury award was $200,000, with awards
at or in excess of $1 million in almost one of four cases. Media defendants faced the same
dismal success rate with juries for the 1990-91 period, winning verdicts in eight out of twenty-
nine trials. The median damage award for the 1990-91 period skyrocketed to $1.5 million. On
average, over 90% of the trial verdicts are decided by juries rather than judges. LDRC Recap and
Update: Trial Results, Damage Awards andAppeals, 1980-89 and 1990-91: The "Chilling Effect"
Writ Large... Then Writ Larger, LDRC BULL. Special Issue B. July 31, 1992, at 3-5 [hereinafter
"LDRC Recap and Update"].
2. Average Libel Award Increases Tenfold, PRESSTIME, Oct. 1991, at 30. An analysis of
1989-90 cases by the Libel Defense Resource Center showed that the media lost 69% of jury
verdicts, up from 58% reported in the two previous years. The average award in the thirty libel
cases that went to verdict in the 1989-90 period was nearly $4.5 million-more than ten times
the average amount in 1987-88, when sixty libel cases went to verdict. An LDRC survey of cases
decided in the early 1980s found the average libel award was more than triple the average award
for medical malpractice cases, prompting Anthony Lewis to observe: "In short, juries seemed to
think that persons whose reputations were wrongfully injured by the press deserved three times
the compensation of those whose bodies had been injured by incompetent doctors." ANTHONY
LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: TE SULUVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AENDMENT 220 (1991).
3. PRESSTIMF. supra note 2, at 30.
4. LDRC RECAP AND UPDATE, supra note 1, at 4.
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These statistical reflections of trial court error and excess highlight
the importance of appellate court review of libel verdicts. Media defen-
dants have come to expect favorable outcomes in the appellate courts. But,
despite their level of present success at the appellate level, the appropriate
scope of appellate court review remains unresolved and is becoming "one
of the most critical emerging issues in libel litigation."5 Narrowing the
scope of independent appellate review could deal a serious blow to the
success rate of media defendants in libel litigation.
This Article examines the application of independent appellate court
review to actual malice determinations in public plaintiff defamation cases.
It first reviews appellate court departure from the traditional fact/law
distinction in so-called "constitutional fact" cases. Next, it examines efforts
by the United States Supreme Court to provide guidance regarding the
scope of independent review in libel cases and assesses how lower courts
have responded. Finally, it concludes that a broad scope of independent
review is to be preferred.
II. THE FACT/LAW DISTINCTION
Distinguishing between questions of fact and questions of law has
been the longstanding approach to allocating decision-making responsi-
bilities between trial and appellate courts in civil cases." Questions of fact
are for trial court triers of fact and are reviewed narrowly and deferentially
on appeal; questions of law are freely reviewed on appeal."
5. RODNEY SmOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12.09[4], at 12-43 (1989).
6. Martin Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Between the Trial and Appellate
Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, The Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986). The fact/law distinction began to take shape after the
adoption in 1937 of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The rule provided that "[flindings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." FED. R. CIrv. P. 52(a). In
1985, the rule was amended to "[flindings of facts, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence..... FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). "Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an
appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so.cailed mixed
finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the
governing rule of law." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
501 (1984).
7. Louis, supra note 6, at 993. Judicial application of the fact/law distinction is often
confusing because the "two categories are used to describe at least three distinct functions: law
declaration, fact identification, and law application." Thomas Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 234 (1985) (emphasis in original). According to Monaghan:
Law declaration involves "formulating a proposition [that] affects not only the [immediate] case
... but all others that fall within its terms."
INDEPENDENT APPELLATE COURT REVIEW
The traditional allocative function of the fact/law distinction,
however, does not fully operate in so-called constitutional fact cases, where
strict adherence to the deference normally owed a lower court's findings of
fact would threaten constitutional values. In these cases, the scope of
appellate review is expanded in order to protect vital constitutional
principles. Cases involving so-called "mixed questions of fact and law,",
as well as questions of "ultimate" constitutional fact,9 are subject to
expanded independent review by the appellate courts. The United States
Supreme Court initiated the concept of independent appellate review in
Fiske v. Kansas'0 when it reversed a conviction for criminal syndicalism
stating it would review the facts found by a state court when a constitution-
al issue was so intermingled with the facts as to make review necessary."
Since then, the Court has exercised its power to independently review lower
court determinations in cases involving a variety of constitutional issues.'
2
Fact identification ... is a case-specific inquiry into what happened
here. It is designed to yield only assertions that can be made without signifi-
cantly implicating the governing legal principles. Such assertions, for example,
generally respond to inquiries about who, when, what, and where-inquiries that
can be made "by a person who is ignorant of the applicable law."...
Law application ... is residual in character. It involves relating the
legal standard of conduct to the facts established by the evidence.
Monaghan, supra, at 235-36 (footnotes omitted).
8. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).
9. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979).
10. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
11. Id. at 385-86.
12. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (independent review of whether
employee's speech was a matter of public concern in wrongful termination action); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (independent review of constitutional protection for flag burning);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (independent review appropriate to determine if
publication was obscene); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (independent review of
disorderly conduct conviction for speaking in public park without permit); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949) (independent review appropriate to determine if confession was voluntary);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (independent review of whether publications posed
a clear and present danger to administration of justice); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) (independent review of whether publications posed a clear and present danger to
administration of justice); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (independent review to
determine if state had unconstitutionally excluded blacks from juries).
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I. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF LIBEL VERDICTS
A. New York Times v. Sullivan
In addition to establishing the requirement that public officials prove
actual malice with convincing clarity, the landmark decision of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan3 was also the United States Supreme Court's first
application of independent appellate review to a libel case. Rejecting the
argument that the Seventh Amendment barred re-examination of state
courts' findings of fact, 4 the Court said that its duty was not limited to
the elaboration of constitutional principles but that it must also, in proper
cases, "review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been
constitutionally applied."'" To do so, said the Court, it is necessary to
"'make an independent examination of the whole record,' . . . so as to
assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion
on the field of free expression."' 6
Thus, in addition to establishing the substantive requirement of actual
malice, the Sullivan decision also instituted a procedural safeguard for
expression by granting appellate judges the final word on whether the
speech at issue is protected by the Constitution. Indeed, libel scholar David
Anderson believes that the expansion of judicial control beginning in the
Sullivan case has "had far greater practical effect than the actual malice rule
itself.""7  The Court's requirement that actual malice be proven with
convincing clarity has had its greatest effect, not on juries, but on judicial
review.'" "The Supreme Court has never explained what the phrase
[convincing clarity] means, but it obviously enhances judges' power to
overturn jury verdicts that under usual rules would have to be accepted."' 9
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Id. at 285 n.26. The Seventh Amendment provides, in part, that "no fact tried by jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. For a discussion of the relationship between the
Seventh Amendment and the role of independent review in libel cases, see Lee Levine, Judge and
Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the Court, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 40
(1985).
15. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285.
16. Id. (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
17. David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487,494 (1991).
18. I,4
19. 1&
INDEPENDENT APPELL4TE COURT REVIEW
In the years following the Sullivan decision, the Court frequently
exercised its independent review of libel verdicts." Such review,
however, focused primarily on correcting the [mis]application of the
evolving actual malice rule to existing facts.2 Libel judgments against
media defendants were often found to have resulted from erroneous
application of the legal standard. '  It was not until Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.' came before the Court in
1984 that the scope of independent appellate review in the context of a libel
case became a central issue for the Court.
B. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
This 1984 product disparagement case involved a review published
in Consumer Reports magazine that was critical of a loudspeaker system
manufactured by the Bose Corporation.24 At the conclusion of a bench
trial in federal district court, the judge ruled that Consumers Union had
published a false and disparaging statement and acted clearly and convinc-
ingly with actual malice by publishing a product review stating that the
sound of the instruments heard through the Bose speakers tended to wander
"about the room," whereas evidence established that the sound actually
tended to wander "along the wall."'  The lower court judge based his
decision against the magazine primarily on a perceived lack of credibility
in the testimony of the reviewer who insisted that he had used the
challenged phrase "about the room" to actually mean "along the wall." The
First Circuit, claiming that it was not bound by the "clearly erroneous"
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a),6 conducted an
20. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Levine, supra note 14, at 47-50.
21. See, e.g., Tine, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279,284 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (question for reviewing court was whether actual malice rule
had been correctly applied to the facts).
22. See Comment, The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases-The Supreme
Court Abandons the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36
MERCER L. REV. 711, 716-18 (1985).
23. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
24. 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), affld, 466 U.S.
485 (1984).
25. 508 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
26. Rule 52(a) provides in part: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
1994"1
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independent review of the entire record and reversed.2 It concluded that
the author had simply used "imprecise language" and was just unwilling to
admit his error. Bose appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the
appellate court was bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact unless
they were clearly erroneous.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.'
In rejecting Rule 52(a) as the standard governing independent review of
libel decisions, the majority opinion by Justice Stevens acknowledged the
strategic importance of appellate review in ensuring the protection afforded
by the actual malice rule established in the Sullivan case. The Court said
that the appellate review requirement was a rule of federal constitutional
law 9 and that:
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defama-
tion case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the
utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a
question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the
Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold
that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by
clear and convincing proof of "actual malice."3°
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, argued that
the constitutional requirement of actual malice, in either its knowing
falsehood or reckless disregard component, was a question of pure historical
fact, a subjective, state-of-mind determination, best left to the trial judge.31
In Justice Rehnquist's view, "appellate courts are simply ill-prepared to
make [such findings] in any context, including the first amendment
context."32 While the majority viewed independent review of the actual
malice finding as an application of law issue, Justice Rehnquist categorized
27. 692 F.2d 189 (1982).
28. Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
29. Id at 510.
30. I& at 511. Independent review applies whether the lower court's fact-finding function
was performed by a jury or by a trial judge. See id at 501.
31. Id at 519 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979).
See also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982) (purely factual findings usually
include inquiries into a defendant's state of mind).
32. Bose, 446 U.S. at 515. In dissent, Justice White believed that the knowing falsehood
component of the actual malice test was an historical fact while the reckless disregard factor was
not. Since the trial court judge had found that the reviewer knew the statement at issue was false
at the time of publication, he would have reversed and remanded based on the court of appeals'
inappropriate, de novo review of the findings. Id.
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the actual malice determination as one of pure historical fact.33 He
distinguished libel cases from those relied on by the majority to justify an
expanded scope of appellate review-such as cases involving obscenity and
fighting words-where questions of mixed fact and law provide a stronger
case for independent fact-finding.'
The Bose case left unanswered many questions regarding the scope
of independent review. As one commentator put it: "The interpretive
challenge [of Bose] ... does not lie in determining whether independent
review is required, but rather lies in determining what independent review
requires.""5 The Court in Bose did not clearly address what it means to
review an "entire" lower court record and the amount of deference owed
to a judge's or jury's determinations of credibility, subsidiary facts,
inferences drawn from those facts, and the aggregation of such inferences
in determining the ultimate question of actual malice. Also left unclear is
whether heightened review applies to issues other than actual malice, such
as falsity, or whether independent review applies differently to summary
judgments, directed verdicts or judgments notwithstanding the verdict
(NoV).
In the years following the Bose decision, lower courts struggled to
apply its holding. Decisions have generally taken either a broad or a
narrow approach to independent review. Sometimes, appellate courts have
gone out of their way to avoid addressing the issue.
Media interests have generally taken the position that the independent
review rule translates into a requirement for de novo review. 6 They point
to the requirement in Sullivan that appellate courts must "make an
independent examination of the whole record"37 and to Justice Stevens'
statement in Bose that 'Tirst Amendment questions of 'constitutional fact'
compel this Court's de novo review."'38
33. ld. at 517-18 n.1.
34. Id. Justice Rehnquist did find a stronger case exists for independent appellate court fact-
finding after a jury trial where there may be a need to compensate for bias or the use of general
verdicts. See id. at 518 n.2.
35. Richard E. Rassell et al., Connaughton v. Harte-Hanks and the Independent Review of
Libel Verdicts, 20 U. TOL L. REv. 681, 693 (1989).
36. Anderson, supra note 17, at 495. When a reviewing court engages in de novo review,
it makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that
judgment should be entered for the plaintiff.
37. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).
38. Bose, 466 U.S. at 508-09 n.27. In addition to the need to protect constitutional values,
the Court in Bose identified two other reasons for reviewing actual malice determinations-the
common law heritage of the rule, which assigns an especially broad role to the judge in applying
it to specific factual situations, and the status of the actual malice rule as a constitutionally-based
19941
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In other words, no deference at all should be accorded any finding
germane to actual malice. To support this position, proponents of the broad
view argue that there are ample reasons to conclude that juries cannot be
relied upon to reach the correct verdict in libel cases: they cannot
comprehend the law,39 are prejudiced against media interests,' and routinely
fail to take into consideration the larger values at stake, such as the need
to prevent chilling effects on the press.4' Instead of being viewed as the
vanguard of free speech for the press, juries in libel cases are highly
suspect,42 supporting Professor Schaner's observation that "much of
contemporary first amendment doctrine, theory, and commentary is devoted
to protecting speech from the jury."'3 Clearly, the reversal rate of jury
verdicts for libel plaintiffs suggests that one or more of these factors exists
in many cases.
An additional problem lending support to the broad view stems from
the use of general verdicts in libel trials. Appellate court panels often begin
with only the trial court's determination that the statements at issue were
false, defamatory and made with actual malice. The appellate court then,
in essence, manufactures findings and inferences which the jury could have
made or must have made in deciding in favor of the plaintiff." If the
court then deferentially reviews these findings, it may be less likely to set
them aside as inadequate proof of actual malice because they were actually
constructed by the reviewing court based on the general verdict alone.45
but, nevertheless, judge-made rule of law given meaning through the evolutionary process of
common law adjudication. Id at 502.
39. See Rebecca Spar, Note, Model Jury Instructions for the "Actual Malice" Standard, 39
Rurs L. REv. 153, 156 (1986).
40. See, e.g., Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 1990) (First Amendment values
will be subverted by a local jury biased in favor of a prominent local public figure against an
alien speaker who criticizes that local hero), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 192 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, L, concurring)
(evidence is mounting that juries do not give adequate attention to limits imposed by First
Amendment), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
42. Erica F. Plave, Note, Tavoulareas v. Piro: An Extensive Exercise of Independent
Judgment, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 854, 856 (1988).
43. Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV.
761, 765 (1986).
44. In a federal district court bench trial, the judge will make specific written findings of law
and findings of fact as required under FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
45. One way in which trial judges can preserve a record of jury findings is to routinely
employ special verdicts in libel cases. For a positive review of special verdicts, see Robert F.
Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601 (1975).
Most states have provisions for special verdicts similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a)
which provides that:
INDEPENDENT APPELLATE COURT REVIEW
Those supporting a narrow application of independent review argue
that expansive review effectively eviscerates the traditional role of trial
court judges and juries, essentially vesting appellate courts with original
jurisdiction in libel cases.4' Such wholesale substitutions of lower court
determinations by a reviewing court would make the trial "little more than
a necessary hurdle en route to the real trial by the judge."'4 Under the
narrow view, Bose does not alter the traditional rules governing the review
of jury verdicts. Thus, judicial deference is constitutionally mandated to
presumed jury findings of underlying facts, evaluations of credibility, and
the inferences drawn.
With regard to the Bose Court's pronouncement that the entire record
should be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, supporters of the narrow
view contend that the decision addressed only the ultimate question of
actual malice, demonstrated by the majority's reliance upon the distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law. The Court in Bose
specifically stated:
Indeed, it is not actually necessary to review the "entire"
record to fulfill the function of independent appellate review
on the actual-malice question; rather, only those portions of
the record which relate to the actual-malice determination must
be independently assessed. The independent review function
is not equivalent to a "de novo" review of the ultimate
judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original
appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it
believes that judgment should be entered for plaintiff."
The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may
submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief
answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a). There is concern, however, that requiring the use of special verdicts could
undermine the "salutary role of a jury's general verdict in safeguarding First Amendment rights."
See Levine, supra note 14, at 70 n.332.
46. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated for reh'g en banc, 763
F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S.
CL 200 (1987). See Martin London, The ."Muzzled Media": Constitutional Crisis or Product
Liability Scam, in AT WHAT PRICE?: LIBEL LAW AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, at 3, 5-6
(Perspectives on the News: A Twentieth Century Fund Paper No. 4, 1993).
47. Rich Brown, Wayne Newton Takes His Case to Supreme Court, BROADCASTING, Aug. 12,
1991, at 30.
48. Bose, 466 U.S. at 514 n31.
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In addition, the Court in Bose observed that examination of the entire
record is not forbidden by Rule 52(a), and that findings of fact can be
overturned under the clearly erroneous standard.49  According to the
narrow view, independent review should serve only to apply the law in
determining whether findings that are not clearly erroneous are sufficient
to clear the actual malice hurdle."0
C. Independent Review in Appellate Courts Following Bose
Following the Court's decision in Bose, both federal and state
appellate courts struggled with the scope of independent review, often
decrying the lack of a clear explanation of the issue." An example of the
fractious nature of the disagreement over the appropriate scope of
independent review is found in the Tavoulareas case. 2
William Tavoulareas, the president of Mobil Oil, alleged that he and
his son were defamed by a 1979 story in the Washington Post that said,
among other things, that he had used his influence to "set up" his son in a
shipping firm whose business included a multi-million dollar management
services contract with Mobil. In 1983, the jury awarded Tavoulareas
$250,000 in compensatory and $1.85 million in punitive damages but the
district court judge overturned the judgment s3 On appeal, a divided panel
reversed the JNOV and reinstated the verdict.'
The majority opinion applied a narrow view of independent review
and held that Bose required review of only the "ultimate fact" of actual
49. Id. at 499. A "'finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed."' (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948)). Id.
50. The Court noted that the First Circuit decision did not overturn any factual finding to
which Rule 52(a) would be applicable. Id. at 514 n.31. It also observed that even accepting all
of the purely factual findings of the district court it may nevertheless hold as a matter of law that
the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Id. at 513. The Court
also said that independent review does not eclipse the Rule 52(a) requirement that due regard be
given to the trial judge's opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Id. at 499-500.
51. See Connaughton v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 842 F.2d 825, 841 (6th Cir.
1988), aft'd, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
52. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nora., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated for rehearing
en banc, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd en bane, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
53. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 567 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1983).
54. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
INDEPENDENT APPELLATE COURT REVIEW
malice and not the preliminary factual findings upon which the ultimate
finding was based. In this view, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences derived from it should be examined in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs-the standard generally employed in reviewing JNOV
determinations."
6
In dissent, Judge Wright assailed the majority opinion as a distortion
of the Bose holding on independent review. His primary criticism was of
the notion that the review process required resolving all inferences in favor
of the plaintiff and that these "malice-laden inferences" must be cumulated
before New York Times/Bose independent review comes into play." The
court vacated and set the case for rehearing."
Sitting en banc, the full panel concluded that the article was
substantially true and upheld the district court's grant of JNOV.59 While
the proper scope of independent review under Bose was the central focus
of the arguments by both parties, the majority opinion dodged addressing
this "difficult enterprise"' by claiming to have reviewed the entire record
using traditional JNOV standards61 in finding that the district court's
verdict for the newspaper had been correct: "[The dispute] is whether Bose
. .. sanctioned independent review as to findings of underlying facts,
evaluations of credibility, and the drawing of inferences .... Sailing into
these uncharted waters is unnecessary to the proper and principled
disposition of this case."'62
55. Id at 107-08. The opinion gives three reasons for this conclusion: (1) Bose is framed
only in terms of the ultimate issue as indicated by the extensive discussion of the distinction
between purely factual findings and so-called ultimate facts; (2) the Bose decision never suggests
that any factual determination other than the ultimate actual malice conclusion may be
independently reviewed; and (3) the fact/law distinction used by the Court in Bose is meaningful
only to distinguish the ultimate issue of actual malice from preliminary facts. Id.
56. Id at 105-06. See Alden v. Providence Hospital, 382 F.2d 163, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
("[U]nless the evidence, along with all inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is such that reasonable jurors in fair and impartial
exercise of their judgment could not reasonably disagree in finding for the defendant, the motion
must be denied.") (footnote omitted); 5A JAMES W. MOORE Er AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE 1
50.07[21 (2d ed. 1984) C'Mhe motion for judgment n.o.v. may be granted only when, without
weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
proper judgment.").
57. 759 F.2d at 146-47 (Wright, J., dissenting).
58. Tavoulareas, 763 F.2d at 1472.
59. Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
60. I4 at 776.
61. Id at 777. See MoomR, supra note 56, at 1 50.07[2].
62. Tavoulareas, 817 F.2d 762, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
1994]
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In dissent, Judge MacKinnon rejected the majority's claim that it had
conducted a traditional JNOV analysis, arguing that the court had invaded
the jury's function by reweighing the evidence, overriding obvious jury
determinations on credibility of witnesses, generally going only about half
way in giving plaintiff the benefit of the inferences to which he was
entitled, and thus refusing to find the underlying facts, as required, in the
manner most favorable to the jury verdict.'
Judge MacKinnon viewed the issue as one of reconciling the
Supreme Court's requirement for independent review in defamation cases
with the "well-settled standard" reiterated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby:
"[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,
whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed
verdict."'  Judge MacKinnon's solution would be to limit appellate
review to the "ultimate constitutional fact" of clear and convincing proof
of actual malice, while accepting the most favorable facts and legitimate
inferences that the jury could reasonably have found for the plaintiff.
65
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Wald also rejected the
majority's claim that it had decided the case without any special application
of the post-Bose independent review standard. 6 Judge Wald claimed
that the court did in fact re-examine and reject permissible inferences that
the jury might have drawn, but felt that such re-examination is sanctioned
under Bose.6' Judge Wald viewed the independent review requirement as
including an examination of even the permissible inferences a jury may
presumably have drawn under the traditional JNOV standard.68 Judge
Wald challenged the panel to tackle the "knotty constitutional issue!
regarding what constitutes independent review under Bose to properly reach
a conclusion as to the absence of actual malice.69 Such clarification,
Judge Wald stated, is badly needed in this volatile area of the law."0
It would appear that the en banc decision in the Tavoulareas case did
indeed apply Bose independent review, and broadly so. As one commenta-
tor has noted:
63. Id. at 810 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
64. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
65. Id. at 816.
66. Id. at 804 (Wald, CJ., concurring).
67. I at 805.
68. Id..
69. Tavoulereas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
70. I& at 806.
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[1It is evident that the court did, in fact, apply Bose in its
review of facts, witness credibility, and inferences pertinent to
finding actual malice. The deference the court ostensibly
extended to the jury's findings correlated only to those
findings with which the court agreed. When the court
disagreed with what the jury presumably could have found,
whether objective facts, credibility of witnesses, or critical
inferences, the court substituted its own evaluations."
Other federal appellate courts, recognizing the difficulty of reconcil-
ing the proper scope of independent review under Bose, have also struggled
to avoid a head-on consideration of the issue. For example, the 1987
decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson72 avoided the "open question" of whether Bose
allows review as to underlying facts, evaluations of credibility, and the
drawing of inferences." It nevertheless applied a wide-ranging scope to
its appellate review while avoiding "the difficult issues left unresolved by
Bose,"'4 because, in its view, both deferential and de novo review yielded
the same result in the case.75
While the court in Brown & Williamson specifically limited its
acceptance of broad-based independent review to the case at hand, it did
suggest that it would fully examine lower court transcripts to ensure a
correct result was reached. To the extent that lower court records might
provide evidence contrary to a jury's credibility findings, the court appeared
ready to act because it did not believe "that Bose requires an appellate court
to believe the unbelievable and to accept the untenable."76  Such a
conclusion, however, would appear to meet the requirement of the clearly
erroneous rule. The court did not specify whether it was willing to
substitute its own conclusions for those made by the lower court that were
not clearly erroneous.
A 1985 decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bartimo v.
Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n" upheld a district court's grant
of involuntary dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to show
that a published article stating he "allegedly" had connections with the
71. Plave, supra note 42, at 877.
72. 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 (1988).
73. Id. at 1128.
74. Id. at 1129.
75. I&
76. Id.
77. 771 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986).
19941
270 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14
mafia was made with actual malice. While it purported to review the entire
lower court record, it declined to review the credibility findings of the
district court or the subsidiary factual findings supporting the ultimate
determination regarding actual malice."'
State courts have also struggled with the independent review issue.
In McCoy v. Hearst Corp.,79 the California Supreme Court reversed a jury
verdict against the San Francisco Examiner because of insufficient evidence
of actual malice. In an example of the broad view of independent review,
the California Supreme Court stated that under Bose, discredited testimony
rejected by the jury could be "salvag[ed] from the heap of disbelief" and
re-interpreted. 0 The California Supreme Court rejected the position that
it was bound to consider the evidence of actual malice in the light most
favorable to respondents or to draw all permissible inferences in their favor.
It stated that it could and would "substitute its own inferences on the issue
of actual malice for those drawn by the trier of fact,"' believing that "it
is constitutionally inadequate to review only those portions of the record
that support the verdict."' 2
A narrower reading of Bose in state court is found in Wanless v.
Rothballer."3 There, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a $500,000
jury verdict, concluding that while it would not re-examine discrete facts,
it would engage in a Bose-required de novo review of the application of
those facts to the actual malice standard."
78. 1L at 898. Cf. Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Bose independent review applies to summary judgment but fact-finder retains its traditional role
in the determination of facts).
79. 727 P.2d 711 (Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), petition to recall remittitur
denied, (Cal. Ct. App. June 10, 1991), aff'd, (Cal. Aug. 28, 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60
U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1992) (No. 91-889).
80. 727 P.2d at 717. The California Supreme Court's reading of Bose as having rejected the
credibility determination of the lower court was clearly in error. The Court repudiated this
interpretation of Bose in Harte-Hanks, 491 S. CL at 689 n.35. The plaintiff's second petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court argues that this misapplication of Bose was critical
to the California Supreme Court's decision and that, had the proper standard of review been
applied, it might well have affirmed the judgment. Brief for Appellant at 7.
81. 727 P.2d at 718.
82. Id.
83. 503 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Il. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987).
84. Id& For a description of the case, see SMOLLA, supra note 5, at 12-48. Other state courts
have adopted a narrow approach to independent review in libel cases. See, e.g., Starkins v.
Bateman, 724 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Ariz. CL App. 1986) (an appellate court is not equipped to
undertake de novo review of underlying facts to detenrnine if they support actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence and to do so would entirely displace the function of the jury in
defamation cases); Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162, 1170 (Vt. 1983) (reviewed evidence of
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In a two-step approach, the court first examined the record to
determine if the jury's resolution of the subsidiary facts, including
credibility assessments, was clearly erroneous. It identified eleven
subsidiary facts with which the jury could have supported its actual malice
finding 9 and on review held that such findings were not clearly errone-
ous.' ° The court proceeded with what it considered to be the Bose-
required independent review-a "second look" that included checking the
entire record to correct errors of law, including errors infecting mixed
findings of law and fact, and examining whether the jury's findings of fact
were predicated on a misunderstanding of a governing rule of law.9 After
weighing the cumulative impact of the subsidiary facts on independent
review, the court held that there was clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice.'
The majority took the position that independent review was properly
limited to a review of the jury's ultimate finding of actual malice, rejecting
the position that independent review required an independent resolution of
subsidiary facts that might be probative of actual malice.93 Thus, the
majority held that, in the case of a plaintiff successful in the trial court, the
inferences from the facts presented at trial should be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff and cumulated before being subjected to appellate review for
constitutional sufficiency.
2. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision but took a
somewhat different approach to the question of independent review." In
the majority opinion, Justice Stevens began his analysis of the issue
reaffirming the importance of the independent review requirement by
stating that reviewing courts must consider the factual record in full to
decide whether the evidence is sufficient to cross the constitutional
threshold of clear and convincing proof of actual malice. 95 The Court
then specified that credibility-based determinations were governed by the
89. uL at 843-44.
90. I& at 844.
91. Id. at 845.
92. ld. at 847.
93. The court criticized the broad scope of review it felt had been applied by the D.C. Circuit
sitting en banc in the Tavoulareas case. See id at 840 n.8.
94. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
95. Id. at 686-88.
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D. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton
The latest word from the United States Supreme Court on the issue
of independent review came in Harte-Hanks Communications v. Con-
naughton," a 1989 public person libel case in which the Court upheld a
$200,000 jury verdict against a small newspaper. The case was brought by
Daniel Connaughton, a former challenger for a municipal judgeship in
Hamilton, Ohio. Connaughton had tape recorded an interview with a
witness who accused the incumbent judge's administrative assistant of
bribery. Connaughton turned over the information to authorities and the
assistant was subsequently convicted of three charges of bribery. The sister
of the witness, who had also participated in the taped interview, went to the
newspaper and claimed that Connaughton had promised the sisters
vacations, jobs and other inducements for providing the information against
the administrator. She also claimed that Connaughton had promised to
keep the information confidential and use it only to confront the incumbent
judge privately so he would be forced to resign. 6
The newspaper, a strong supporter of the incumbent, published the
sister's allegations that Connaughton had used "dirty tricks" such as
promises of jobs and vacations to acquire information useful against the
incumbent. This was done without questioning the first sister who
participated in the interview or listening to the tapes of the interview that
had been made available to the newspaper. Connaughton sued for libel and
a federal district court jury found the statements were defamatory and had
been made with actual malice.'
1. The Sixth Circuit's Decision
By a 2 to 1 vote, the Sixth Circuit affirmed."8 The decision
provides an example of a narrow view of independent review. In ruling for
the plaintiff, the Sixth Circuit rejected the idea that independent review
required an independent resolution of subsidiary facts underlying the jury's
finding of actual malice. It held that such subsidiary facts, including
inferences drawn from credibility determinations, were subject only to the
clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
malice in the light most favorable to plaintiff).
85. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
86. Id at 660.
87. Id at 660-61.
88. Connaughton v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 842 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1988).
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clearly erroneous rule.6 The Court acknowledged that the jury may have
found the eleven subsidiary facts identified by the Sixth Circuit but
concluded that the case should be decided "on a less speculative
ground."'  Justice Stevens then constructed three testimonial-based
findings that the jury must have rejected in order to have found actual
malice s Presumably discerning no clear error, the Court considered these
three findings alongside the undisputed evidence and concluded that actual
malice inextricably followed. 9
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, labeled as "peculiar" the
manner in which the majority opinion resolved the independent review
question." He noted with approval that the majority had adopted the
most significant element of the Sixth Circuit's approach-accepting the
jury's determination of at least the necessarily found controverted facts
rather than making an independent resolution of the conflicting testimo-
ny.' Taking the narrow view, Justice Scalia characterized the proper
scope of the majority's evidentiary review as limited to whether the jury
could reasonably have reached its conclusions, rather than the Courts
exercising its own independent judgment on the permissible conclusions to
be drawn from the testimony. °2
Justice Scalia also took issue with the majority's reliance on the
identification of three justifications that it claimed the jury must have
rejected in order to have concluded that the paper acted with the requisite
actual malice. In his view, even rejection of one of the three justifications
96. Id at 688.
97. Id. at 690.
98. Id at 690. The Court concluded that the jury must have rejected the newspaper
employees' testimony that: (1) they didn't talk to the other sister because Connaughton failed to
place them in touch with her, (2) the taped interview was not listened to because they believed
it would provide no new information; and (3) they believed the allegations against Conaughton
were substantially true. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
The Supreme Court noted--as did the court of appeals-that there was evidence in the record that
would have supported either the conclusion that the sister or the judicial candidate was lying. Id.
at 681.
99. Harte-Hanks Communications, 491 U.S. at 690-91.
100. Id at 697 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id at 698. Justice White, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, repeated
his position taken in Bose that the trial court's findings of historical fact, including the knowing
falsehood component of the actual malice rule, were reviewable only under the clearly erroneous
standard. Id at 694 (White, I., concurring). Justice White found this view consistent with the
views of Justice Scalia. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694
(1989). Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, also endorsed the analysis of Justice Scalia.
Id at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. Id at 696.
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would have provided a sufficient basis for clear and convincing proof of
actual malice. Justice Scalia endorsed the Sixth Circuit's analysis in its
entirety and said he would limit reviewing courts' independent assessment
to whether actual malice was clearly and convincingly proved. The
limitation would be based on the assumption that the jury had made all the
supportive findings for the plaintiff reasonably possible. 3
Justice Scalia identified the "nub of the conflict," which he
recognized as being "of overwhelming importance in libel actions by public
figures,"'O° as whether
the trial judge and reviewing courts must make their own
"independent" assessment of the facts allegedly establishing
malice; or rather.., that they must merely make their own
"independent" assessment that, assuming all of the facts that
could reasonably be found in favor of the plaintiff were found
in favor of the plaintiff, clear and convincing proof of malice
was established."°5
While the Harte-Hanks decision makes clear that lower court
findings of fact anchored in credibility determinations must be accepted
unless clearly erroneous, many questions remain as to the proper scope of
review of trial verdicts. It appears that the resolution of basic historical
facts in dispute that are anchored in credibility determinations are for the
jury as long as such conclusions are not clearly erroneous. For example,
if a defendant reporter claims to have interviewed the plaintiff extensively,
and the plaintiff claims never to have talked to the reporter, it is up to the
jury to decide who is telling the truth.
But, as the Court acknowledged in Bose, discredited testimony is not
a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion of knowing false-
hood." What is unclear is what level of discretion appellate courts have
in weighing the evidence once the jury has made factual findings based on
credibility. Also unclear is whether the jury's inferences drawn from facts
anchored in credibility determinations are subject to vigorous de novo
review or whether they must be accepted, cumulated, and only then
compared to the actual malice standard.0" The decision in Harte-Hanks
103. Id. at 699.
104. Id. at 697.
105. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 697 (1989).
106. Bose, 466 U.S. at 512. See Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 340 U.S. 573, 576
(1951) (discredited testimony is not a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion of
knowing falsehood). Inconsistent testimony, however, may be probative of actual malice. See
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2241, 2252 (1991).
107. See Anderson, supra note 17, at 495 n.22.
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was made easier by the existence of strong, uncontroverted evidence
probative of actual malice. With the jury having rejected credibility-based
testimony supporting the newspaper's case, the Court turned to several
"critical" pieces of uncontroverted evidence that strongly supported the
inference of actual malice:' the newspaper had not interviewed the most
important source despite denials by six witnesses about the allegations
against Connaughton; the newspaper had not listened to the tape of the
interview despite its obvious news value; and the newspaper witnesses gave
significantly discrepant testimony about how the newspaper went about
preparing the story.
E. Independent Review Following Harte-Hanks
Striking the proper balance over the scope of independent review has
continued to present "a daunting task""' 9 to federal and state appellate
courts, even after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Harte-
Hanks. For example, in Newton v. NBC, ° the Ninth Circuit reversed a
$5.3 million jury award. The court concluded that Bose and Harte-Hanks
had created a "credibility exception" to the Sullivan rule of independent
review."' It constructed a two-tier approach to the review process,
applying different degrees of deference to various jury findings. Presump-
tions of correctness about findings of fact that turn on credibility carry
"maximum force," while the presumption applies with less force "when a
factfinder's findings rely on its weighing of evidence and drawing of
inferences.""'
Even though the Ninth Circuit's decision in Newton contains
language acknowledging its responsibility to defer to the jury's credibility
findings, the panel seems uncomfortable with the task of reconciling respect
for the jury's factfinding with its role in protecting First Amendment
values. The panel expressed concern that the jury was biased in its verdict
in favor of the local hero and warned that "we cannot ignore the risk that
a jury's credibility determinations may also subvert those [First Amend-
ment] values.""' 3 The court undertook an extensive recitation and review
of the testimonial evidence and even singled out certain credibility
108. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 682-83.
109. Newton v. NBC, 930 F.2d 662,672 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 192 (1991).
110. Id. at 687.
111. Id. at 671.
112. Id. at 670-71.
113. I& at 672.
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determinations to which it was not willing to defer.114 On balance, the
independent review in the Newton case was decidedly broad. s
A strikingly different view of the independent review issue in the
wake of Harte-Hanks is presented by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Ball
v. E.W. Scripps Co.n 6 In Ball, the court reinstated a $175,000 jury
verdict against The Kentucky Post in favor of a local prosecutor. In
assessing the proper standard of independeit review, the Kentucky Supreme
Court noted that it was not absolutely clear that the Harte-Hanks decision
embraced the view that a reviewing court should defer to all subsidiary
facts that the jury could have found. Nevertheless, it embraced Justice
Scalia's opinion in the case and concluded that the Harte-Hanks decision
was either completely co-extensive with the Sixth Circuit's extremely
narrow approach, or nearly so.
117
The proper scope of independent review following Harte-Hanks was
also a central issue in Bressler v. Fortune Magazine,"" where the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, by a 2 to 1 vote, reversed a federal district court
jury's $550,000 award against Fortune magazine. In her dissenting
opinion, Judge Batchelder assailed the majority for failing to accord the
proper deference to the jury's credibility determinations:
Because there is in the record evidence that creates a genuine
factual issue as to what the reporters' subjective beliefs were,
the majority finds that the judgment cannot stand. But the test
is not whether there is evidence in the record which puts the
facts regarding the reporters' state of mind into genuine issue,
nor is the test whether there is evidence which, if believed,
would show that the reporters acted in good faith. The test is
whether the jury, in believing some of the testimony and in
rejecting other testimony was clearly erroneous, and if it was
114. Newton, 930 F.2d at 683. Noting that the credibility of a journalist's source should be
a separate inquiry from the credibility of the journalist himself, the panel refused to accept the
jury's apparent finding that the journalists' explanations for not including a source's information
in a news story were not credible simply because the jury had found the source to be credible
when the journalists had not. M,
115. For a discussion of the Newton case, see Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc.:
Evidence ofActual Malice, the Editorial Process and the Mafia in Public Figure Defamation Law,
22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 235,248 (1992). ("The court thus concluded that under the doctrine
of independent review, with the exception of credibility determinations, all evidence of actual
malice is reviewed de novo in actions arising under the First Amendment.").
116. 801 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
117. Id, at 689.
118. 971 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1992).
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not, whether there is sufficient evidence in the record clearly
and convincingly to establish actual malice .... Where the
record contains such evidence, to overturn the jury's finding
of actual malice because there is also evidence to the contrary,
without regard to the jury's right to disbelieve that contrary
evidence unless it was clearly erroneous in doing so, is, in
effect, to hold that the jury may not find actual malice unless
there is no evidence in the record which, if believed, would
support a finding of good faith. That is not the law."9
IV. CONCLUSION
There is at present no consistent application of independent review
procedures by either federal or state courts in libel cases. Courts seem
wary of directly confronting the issue. When the issue is addressed, there
is often considerable disagreement about the appropriate method of analysis.
Further clarification by the Supreme Court is necessary.
Overall, it seems that most appellate courts have applied a broader
view of independent review, sometimes under the guise of deference to
lower court findings. As Smolla pointed out about the Tavoulareas case:
The court was deferential only with regard to basic prelimi-
nary facts, and only with regard to purely factual inferenc-
es-inferences, for example, as to what particular actions or
statements establish concerning basic motives. The court
refused, however, to give any deference to the mixed factual
and legal inferences that could be drawn from these facts."'
The Ninth Circuit in the Newton case did essentially the same thing.
While it acknowledged that the "credibility exception" in Harte-Hanks
applies with maximum force, it also emphasized that a jury's finding that
a journalist's sources were not credible must be interpreted in terms of the
credibility that the journalist bestowed-correctly or incorrectly--on those
sources. On factual issues not involving witness credibility-weighing
evidence and drawing inferences-the Ninth Circuit extended far less
deference. Other courts have taken a significantly narrower view.
The Harte-Hanks decision provided little additional guidance on the
parameters of independent review. Credibility determinations can be
reversed only if they are clearly erroneous, but issues about weighing the
119. Id at 1256 (Batchelder, J, dissenting).
120. SMOI.LA, supra note 5, § 12.09[4] at 12-49.
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evidence and drawing inferences were not clearly addressed. While Harte-
Hanks makes clear that factual conclusions anchored in credibility
determinations must be accepted unless clearly erroneous, a finding that a
defendant's explanations are not credible falls far short of the necessary
proof of actual malice. It also remains unclear whether the Constitution
requires independent review of all elements in a libel case, such as falsity,
and whether the standard for independent review is different in a summary
judgment or directed verdict context.1
2 1
A broader use of appellate review is preferable. The paramount goal
of independent review is to ensure that cases are correctly decided so that
constitutional values remain protected. This is clearly the course charted
by the Supreme Court in Sullivan and Bose. As one commentator has
suggested:
[I]t is difficult to argue that actual malice requires judges and
juries to search out and punish journalistic malpractice.
Rather, Bose, like [Sullivan], suggests that actual malice has
less to do with factual issues of credibility and subjective
intent than with identifying a legally mandated category of
expression-knowing or reckless falsehood-unworthy of
constitutional protection. Although factual findings are
certainly not irrelevant to the actual malice determination,
Bose reestablishes its essentially judgmental, and hence
judicial, quality." 2
The determination of actual malice is more of a law application
function than a state of mind fact identification. Although the Court's
decision in Bose has been criticized by Monoghan for charging appellate
courts with an absolute "duty" to perform review, he correctly interpreted
the Court's mandate:
An appellate court cannot content itself with accepting the
results of a "reasonable" application of admittedly correct legal
norms to the historical facts. The court's responsibility is to
scrutinize the record and marshall the evidence to see if it
yields the characterization put on it by the court below.' 3
This is not to say that juries are superfluous to libel litigation. The
actual malice standard, in addition to being an ultimate issue of constitu-
tional fact, requires an assessment of the defendant's state of mind, which
121. The Court in Harte-Hanks did not address the issue of independent review of the falsity.
For a discussion of independent review of summary judgment, see Levine, supra note 14, at 76.
122. Levine, supra note 14, at 37.
123. Monaghan, supra note 7, at 242.
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is often drawn from circumstantial evidence interpreted from testimony.
But the fundamental lesson of the Sullivan case is that libel litigation is
distinct from ordinary civil litigation because of the precious constitutional
liberties involved. Resolution of the independent review issue should begin
by recognizing that "[tihe Constitution may be just as easily subverted by
manipulation of the 'preliminary' facts in the record as by manipulation of
the ultimate conclusions.""2 4 Such concerns should be considered by the
Supreme Court in clarifying the proper scope of review. By striking the
proper balance, the Court can suitably preserve the First Amendment values
involved in libel litigation.
124. SMoL A, supra note 5. § 12.09[4] at 12-52 (emphasis omitted).
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